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CHOICE OF LAW RULE
James A. DeMent, Jr.
Due to increasing volumes of international trade' and international
travel,2 consumers around the world are more frequently buying and
using products far removed from their original place of manufacture.
As the purchase and use of internationally distributed merchandise rises,
so also does the risk that a consumer may be injured by a hazardous
product manufactured in a legal jurisdiction totally different from the
one in which he resides.3 At present, however, a consumer injured in
such circumstances often finds that his attempts to obtain redress for
his injuries are thwarted by the existence of divergent laws, rules, and
procedures in the various nations that might, in some way, be connected
with his claim. This divergence often presents such formidable barriers
to the consumer as uncertainty, delay, and burdensome legal expense.
Therefore, with the greater incidence of products liability litigation that
is apt to be attendant to the continuing expansion of international com-
merce and trade, it is imperative that many of the present impediments
to a consumer's speedy redress of his injuries be removed as quickly
as possible. One step in the removal of such impediments, which would
help eliminate confusion and uncertainty in the area of international
products liability litigation, would be the promulgation and adoption
of an internationally accepted uniform choice of law rule.
1. Total world exports have increased steadily over the past decade. From 1960 to
1969, the last year for which comparative figures are available, total world ex-
ports more than doubled from $128.0 billion to $269.9 billion. THE NEW YORK
TIMEs ALMANAC 1970 at 647 (1971).
2. An indication of the increasing trend in international travel may be taken
from a comparison of the number of new and renewed passports issued betweerd
1960 and 1969 by the United States Passport Office. In 1960 only 859,087 pass-
ports had been issued to Americans for travel abroad. By 1969, the same figure
was 1,820,192. These statistics do not, of course, reflect additional American travel
to such Western Hemisphere nations as Canada, Mexico, Bermuda, etc., nor do they
indicate the number of individuals of other nations who also travel international-
ly. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BooK OF FAcrs 222 (1971).
8. The well-known tragic effects of the West German manufactured drug,
Thalidamide, for example, were experienced by families all over the world. Liti-
gation arising out of the use of that drug has been settled in West Germany
and Great Britain, but it still continues in Japan. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Mar. 24,
1970, at 11, col. 1; id., Dec. 19, 1970, at 3, col. 4; id., Jan. 3, 1971, at 11, col.
1; id., Feb. 19, 1971, at 5, col. 1.
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I. THE DIFFICULTIES AND UNCERTAINTIES IN PRESENT
INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION
A. DIVERGENT SUBSTANTIVE LAWS
Initially, a consumer injured by a product which has entered the
stream of international commerce4 is faced with many of the substantive
issues which are routine to any civil litigation and which are ordinarily
resolved by the law of the nation wherein the court hearing the case is
located. Thus, no matter in which nation the consumer initiates a claim
for the redress of his injuries, he must evaluate the possibility of the
success of his cause of action in light of the merits of his claim as well
as in light of the relevant rules of evidence and the appropriate alloca-
tions of burdens of proof which are adhered to by the court adjudicating
his law suit.
Unlike the consumer injured by a domestically manufactured product,
however, a consumer injured by a product of foreign manufacture is
also confronted with a confusing morass of often contradictory statutes
and precedents which may govern matters pertinent to his claim. If,
for instance, a consumer purchases a defective product in a country dif-
ferent from either the one in which he resides or the one in which the
product was manufactured, he is faced with the possibility that three
different sets of laws may be, individually or in combination, determina-
tive of the crucial issue of whether, in fact, he has a maintainable cause
of action against the manufacturer. Even if such a suit is maintainable,
recovery might be barred by a statute of limitations or by a statute
preventing enforcement of the judgment in the foreign defendant's home
jurisdiction.5 Other important issues involve the application of statutes
4. Commerce may become "international" in three ways: first, a product may
be exported abroad and then subsequently bought by a native or foreign traveler
in the importing country; second, a product may be bought by a foreign traveler in
the country where it was originally manufactured and then carried back by the
traveler to his home country; or third, a product may be manufactured by a
local division of a foreign corporation.
In the third instance, the international character of the manufacturing process
would depend a great deal on whether the product was manufactured by a
"branch" or a wholly-owned subsidiary of the foreign corporation. If the product
were manufactured by a branch, it could properly be said to have been manu-
factured in "international commerce" due to the direct relationship of the
branch to the parent organization. In the case of a wholly-owned subsidiary, how-
ever, it might be more appropriate to consider the manufacturing process as
being purely local due to the separate legal entities represented by the parent
corporation on the one hand and the wholly-owned subsidiary corporation on
the other.
5. Some attempts have already been made to solve this particular problem
on an international scale. The 1964 Hague Conference on Private International
Law resolved to devote future work to the "Matter of Recognition and En-
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which might limit a manufacturer's liability to a specific amount or
which might prevent the manufacturer from being a defendant to the
consumer's cause of action.6
Clearly, then, where parties of different nationalities are involved,
the choice as to which of several alternative laws will govern a claim
for redress of injuries in a products liability case 7 may be, in itself,
determinative of the success or failure of the plaintiff's cause of action.
Thus, a careful plaintiff with adequate financial and legal resources
is initially faced with the task of analyzing the possible outcome of his
case under the substantive law of several different nations, each of
which might possibly be the source of the "governing law" over his
claim.8
The dilemma which may be faced by a plaintiff in this respect is
readily illustrated by the not too implausible case of a West German
citizen who, while in France, purchases a defective product manufac-
forcement of Foreign Judgments." Final Act of the Tenth Session of the Hague
Convention on Private International Law, reprinted in Graveson, The Tenth
Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 14 INT'L & COnP.
L.Q. 558, 575-77 (1965). See also Nadelmann, Status of Hague Conventions on
Private International Law, 19 Am. J. CoMP. L. 587 (1971>.
The problem has been dealt with in the United States by the Uniform Foreign
Money Judgments Recognition Act promulgated by the Commissioners on Uni-
form State Law. 9B U.LA. 66-69 (ist ed. 1966). The Act has been adopted in
California, Illinois, Maryland, and Oklahoma. 9B U.L.A. Supp. 16 (1st ed. 1967).
See Document, Uniform Foreign Money Judgments Recognition Act, 11 Am. J.
CoMP. L. 412 (1962).
6. For instance, formerly under English common law, a party injured by a
defectively manufactured product had to be in "privity of contract" with the
manufacturer before he would be allowed to bring a claim against the manu-
facturer for the injuries he had suffered. This meant that the injured party had
to prove that he had acquired the product directly from the manufacturer and
that either the manufacturer had in some way warranted that the product was
safe to be used for the purpose it was intended or the manufacturer had not
exercised due care in the manufacture of the product. See Winterbottom v. Wright,
10 M. 9- W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842); Earl v. Lubbock, [1 9 0 5] 1 K.B.
253.
The rule in these two cases was subsequently discarded in M'Alister v. Steven-
son, [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.).
7. The term "product liability case" is used in a general sense to refer to any
litigation, whether in contract or tort, which arises from a plaintiff's attempt to
recover damages for personal injuries he has sustained as a result of a defectively
manufactured product. The defendent in such action may be any party, e.g.,
manufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer, against whom, by law, the plaintiff may
assert his case.
See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTs §§ 95-99 (3d ed.
1964).
8. The "governing law" of a products liability case is that law which is ap-
plied to, and is determinative of, the substantive issues involved in the case. For
details on how one particular nation's law might be chosen as the "governing
law," see text accompanying notes 28-63 infra.
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tured by an American corporation and who, upon returning home to
West Germany, is seriously injured by that product. When the West
German citizen attempts to enforce legally his claim for redress of the
damages and injuries he has sustained, the success of his efforts may
well depend on the selection of one of three different laws. If, for ex-
ample, West German law is held to be determinative of his claim against
the manufacturer, then it is unlikely that he will be able to recover any
damages at all. Under West German law, to recover damages from the
manufacturer under these circumstances, the plaintiff-consumer would
be required to show that the manufacturer or his employees had been
negligent in the production of the defective goods.9 Proof of such negli-
gence, if indeed there was any, might be difficult if not impossible to
obtain.
On the other hand, were the West German consumer's claim gov-
erned by American law, his chances of success might be much greater.
Principles of strict liability have become deeply engrained in American
common law,10 and it would not be surprising if recovery were allowed
against the manufacturer, regardless of whether the manufacturer's
negligence was proved as a matter of fact. 1
9. Kessler, Products Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 887, 911-20 (1967). An excellent
analysis of the complexities of West German law vis t vis product liability may
also be found in Szladits, Comparative Aspects of Product Liability, 16 BUFFALO
L. REV. 229 (1966) and Donnelly, Principled and Nonprincipled Development:
A Comparison of the Shift from the Fault Principle in American Products Li-
ability Law and the Evolution of Strict Liability in Civil Law, 17 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 419 (1966). Cf. E. COHN, MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW 312, 313, 319, 326,
330 (2d ed. 1968); R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 379-80 (3d ed. 1970) and
authorities listed therein.
10. RESTATE,,iENT (SEcoND> Or TORTS § 402 A (1965) (Special Liability of Seller
of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer):
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or con-
sumer, or to his property if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (I) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relationship with the seller ...
See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-315 (Implied Warranty: Fitness for
Particular Purpose), 2-318 (Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or Im-
plied); Szladits, supra note 9; Kessler, supra note 9, at 895-911.
11. See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897
(1963>, which held that a power tool manufacturer was absolutely responsible for
personal injuries resulting from the use of his defective product.
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In the middle of the two extremes presented by West German law
and American law, French law might yield a result that, under the
circumstances of this litigation, could easily go either way. French law
does recognize a form of strict liability,'2 but it is more frequently en-
forced against the vendor from whom the injured party directly ac-
quired the defective product.13 If the immediate seller is insolvent or is,
for some other reason, an undesirable defendant, the plaintiff may pro-
ceed directly against the manufacturer in an action recursoire.14 If, how-
ever, the plaintiff delays in bringing his suit, his recovery may be barred
by a rather short statute of limitations.15 Thus, the success of the plain-
tiff's claim under French law might easily depend on the speed with
which he brought his suit against the original manufacturer of the de-
fective product.
16
B. DIVERGENT CHOICE OF LAw RuLEs
Just as a careful plaintiff must analyze the different types of sub-
stantive laws which might possibly be held to govern his claim in an in-
Due to the increasing use of strict liability standards in American product liability
cases, judicial preoccupation with the distinction between "contract" and "tort" actions
is on the decline:
A breach of warranty, it is now clear, is not only a violation of the sales
contract out of which the warranty arises but it is a tortious wrong
suable by a noncontracting party whose use of the warranted article is
within the reasonable contemplation of the vendor or manufacturer.
Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 436, 191 N.E.2d 81, 82 (1963).
12. Article 1382 of the French Civil Code provides:
Every act of a person which damages another makes the person by whose
fault the damage occurred liable to make reparation for such damage.
Tout fait quelconque de l'homme, qui cause A autrui un dommage, oblige
celui par la faute duquel il est arrive, A le r~parer.
Cf. F. LAWSON, A. ANTON & L. BROWN, A,%tos & NVALTON'S INTRODUCTION
TO FRENCH LAw 211-13 (3d ed. 1967).
13. See Kessler, supra note 9, at 922-23.
In such cases, the victim:
may either employ the action oblique, or bring an action directe, relying upon
the doctrine that each successive sale implies a transfer of all rights of action
relating to the thing sold.
F. LAwsoN, A. ANTON, & L. BROWN, supra note 12, at 362-63.
14. F. LAWSON, A. ANTON, & L. BROWN, supra note 12, at 363.
15. Article 1648 of the French Civil Code provides that there should be a "short
delay" in bringing the suit depending on "the nature of the defect or the usage
of the place where the sale was made." The length of the delay is left to the discretion
of the court of first instance. Szladits, supra note 9, at 247 n. 97; Kessler, supra note
9, at 923 n. 213.
16. Statute of limitations problems may be further complicated by the forum's
opinion on whether such statutes are substantive or procedural to the case at hand.
If the forum treats the statute of limitations as substantive, then the law which is
made determinative of the merits of the case (the "governing law') becomes crucial to
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ternational products liability case, so must he also evaluate the choice
of law rules of the various forums which might adjudicate his claim. 17
Thus, continuing the hypothetical set out above, if a West German
citizen were to bring his product liability suit in West Germany or in
France, a court in either nation would most likely apply the choice
of law rule that the lex loci delicti commissi governs, i.e., that the law
of the nation wherein the tort took place is controlling.'8 Application
of this single rule might not, however, lead to identical results in each
country.
Both France and West Germany define the situs of a tort (the loci
delicti) as "where the allegedly tortious conduct was carried out."'1
Therefore, according to whatever interpretation a forum might select,
the West German plaintiff's cause of action could still be governed
either by the law of the United States (defendant's tortious conduct
was carried out where the product was manufactured), France (de-
fendant's tortious conduct was carried out where the defective product
was sold), or West Germany (defendant's tortious act was carried
out where the plaintiff was injured by the defectively manufactured
product).
A similar absence of clarity may also exist by the use of several dif-
ferent choice of law rules within the same country, especially within the
United States. In some United States jurisdictions, for instance, local
state courts subscribe to the same civil law rule that lex loci delicti
commissi governs, 20 and they further interpret that rule to mean that
this issue as well. If, however, the forum treats statutes of limitations as procedural,
then the law of the forum, regardless of other choice of law considerations, is con-
clusive on this point. For a discussion of this topic in the federal context of United
States choice of law problems, see Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
17. A plaintiff's task in an international products liability case is, therefore, two-
fold. In order to determine in which forum he has the greatest likelihood of success,
a plaintiff must, first, determine the substantive law of the nations which might be
held to govern his cause of action, e.g., West Germany, the United States, or France,
and second, he must determine which choice of law rules in those nations will fa-
cilitate the selection of the law he wants to apply to his case. Thus, even after a
West German plaintiff has decided that American law would probably be most bene-
ficial to his case, he must still determine which choice of law rule in either West
Germany, the United States, or France will allow the American law to be de-
terminatve.
18. See 2 E. RAnEL, THE CONFLICT OF LAws: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 235-36 (2d ed.
1958) and the French and German authorities cited therein; Cavers, Legislative
Choice of Law: Some European Examples, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 340, 350-51 (1971) and
the French authorities cited therein.
19. 2 E. RABEL, supra note 18, at 303-304, 304 n. 12 (France and West Germany),
316 (West Germany). See also Dalaume, International Development in Choice of Law
Governing Torts: Recent French Decisions, 19 Am. J. CoMP. L. 7, 8-9 (1971) (France).
20. 2 J. BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAws § 378.1 (1935) (emphasis supplied):
It is impossible for a plaintiff to recover in tort unless he has been given
by some law a cause of action in tort; and this law can be given only by
the law of the place where the tort was committed.
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the situs of the tort is where the plaintiff actually sustains bodily
injury.21 On the other hand, other United States jurisdictions have
adopted a more recent "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts"
approach to choice of law decisions. 22 Thus in some United States
jurisdictions, under the lex loci delicti approach, the law of West
Germany (place of plaintiff's injury) would govern the products
liability litigation at hand, whereas in other United States jurisdictions,
depending on the court's decision as to which nation had the most
"contacts" with the circumstances of the present litigation, the govern-
ing law might be held to be that of either the United States (the de-
fendant's residence and the nation in which the litigation was being
conducted), France (the nation in which the defective product was
purchased), or West Germany (the plaintiff's residence and the nation
in which he was injured).
II. THE NEED FOR A UNIFORM CHOICE OF LAW RULE
As illustrated by the foregoing hypothetical example, 23 it is obvious-
ly crucial that a plaintiff-consumer, wishing to maximize his chances
of success in a products liability suit, know with some predictability
not only the substantive law of the nation that may govern his cause
of action, but that he know, as well, the status of the choice of law rule
in the forum wherein his action may be brought.2 4 Predictability is,
21. Id. §§ 378.1-378.4.
22. This approach is also known as the "Babcock Approach" in reference to the
New York Court of Appeals' landmark decision in Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d
473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963). In Babcock, the Court held that, in an automobile ac-
cident injury case in which the accident had occurred on a Canadian highway but
the injured passenger-guest and the allegedly negligent motorist were both resi-
dents of New York, the issue of the motorist's negligence was to be determined in
accordance with Canadian law. The Court further held, however, that the issue of
whether the passenger-guest could properly maintain a cause of action against
the motorist for redress of the damages she had suffered as a result of the accident
was governed by the law of New York.
Extending to torts the "center of gravity" and "grouping of contacts" theories
earlier applied to contracts in the case of Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.
2d 99 (1954), the Court said:
[T]here is no reason why all issues arising out of a tort claim must be
resolved by reference to the law of the same jurisdiction. Where the issue
involves standards of conduct, it is more than likely that it is the law of
the place of the tort which will be controlling but the disposition of other
issues must turn, as does the issue of the standard of conduct itself, on
the law of the jurisdiction which has the strongest interest in the resolution
of the particular issue presented.
12 N.Y.2d at 484, 191 N.E.2d at 285.
23. See text accompanying notes 4-22 supra.
24. See note 17 supra.
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however, scarce at present in many cases of this nature. A determination
of the most advantageous law and choice of law rules to a plaintiff's
case often involves the tedious and time consuming efforts of numerous
lawyers, judges, and expert witnesses with the ultimate result that, in
retrospect, the decisions finally reached are hardly worth the expense
involved in reaching them. This is especially evident when the choice
of law applicable to a particular issue may vary internally within the
case itself.25 The difficulty, expense, and uncertainty of single or
multiple choice of law determinations may thus effectively inhibit a
consumer from bringing a meritorious claim against a delinquent manu-
facturer.
In light of the hardships and inequities26 which might accompany
this "de facto" denial of relief to an injured consumer, a uniform,
easily understood international choice of law rule would be a valuable
weapon for the protection of consumers who may be far removed from
their potential defendants. 27 The increasing volume of international
trade and the increasing opportunity for consumers to be injured by
products manufactured in foreign jurisdictions would appear to make
such a rule not only convenient but also essential to future litigation
in the important area of manufacturers' liability for the production of
defective merchandise. Additionally, the successful international adop-
tion of such a rule would serve a twofold purpose. First, it would fa-
cilitate consumer recoveries against manufacturers; and second, it would
encourage manufacturers to adopt higher standards of care in their
production processes in order to avoid subsequent consumer liability.
Thus, not only would the consumer benefit from fewer obstacles to
successful litigation, he would also benefit from more safely manu-
factured merchandise.
25. See, e.g., Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526(1961), which held that a cause of action based on breach of an alleged contract of
safe carriage was governed by Massachusetts law, but that the subject of the extent
of recoveries allowable under a Massachusetts wrongful death statute was governed,
instead, by New York law. See also note 22 supra.
26. The present uncertainty in international products liability cases favors those
who are actually in the least need of reimbursement for their injuries. The wealthy
consumer, able to afford large legal expenses, is really the one most likely to re-
cover damages from a manufacturer. The poorer consumer, on the other hand, who
may be in greater need of reimbursement in order to meet his high medical ex-
penses, is the one least likely to be able to afford either the time or money necessary
for a successful recovery.
27. Great distances between a plaintiff and a defendent merely emphasize the
complications that may arise when a consumer is injured by a product of foreign
manufacture, but choice of law complications may arise even where very short dis-
tances are involved. The controlling factor in such circumstances is the possible
interplay of the law of several different nations. Distance may merely serve to com-
pound the problems already involved.
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III. PROPOSALS FOR A UNIFORM CHOICE OF LAW RULE
A. SELECTION OF THE GOVERNING LAW IN ACCORDANCE WITH
PLAINTIFF'S PREFERENCE
One logical approach to the development of a predictable, uniform,
easily understood choice of law rule in international products li-
ability cases would be simply to allow a consumer injured by a defec-
tively manufactured product to specify which of several alternative
nations' law would govern his substantive claim against the defendant-
manufacturer. 28 This approach was initially considered by the Special
Commission on Products Liability of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law.29 The Commission, motivated by the "need to
protect the victim," 30 believed that this type of choice of law rule
28. It would be to the plaintiff's best advantage, of course, to make the term
"manufacturer" as all-inclusive as possible. The more parties the definition included,
e.g., manufacturers, suppliers, distributors, repairers, the greater would be the number
of potential defendants against whom the consumer could proceed. See note 44 infra.
29. The Special Commission on Products Liability was created by the 1964 Tenth
Quadrennial Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law. See gen-
erally Bourke, Birth of an International Convention- Hague Conference on Private
International Law; Special Commission on Torts, 9 HARV. INT'L L.J. 277 (1968>.
The Special Commission has held two working sessions at The Hague, meeting
once from September 7-12, 1970, and most recently from March 29-April 6, 1971.
Eighteen countries (Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Arab
Republic, United Kingdom, United States of America, Yugoslavia) were represented
at the first working session. They were later joined by Czechoslovakia and Greece at
the second working session. Professor W. L. M. Reese, Director of the Parker School
of Foreign and Comparative Law, Columbia University, and the United States
representative to the Special Commission, was elected Rapporteur for both working
sessions. As will appear below, Professor Reese has been a valuable source of au-
thority in the preparation of this article. See, e.g., notes 33, 43, 56, and 61 infra.
The second working session of the Special Commission on Products Liability
reached a consensus on a "draft" Convention which, though untitled, may be thought
of as a "Convention on Uniform Choice of Law Rules in International Products
Liability Litigation." This "draft" Convention will next be presented to, and dis-
cussed by, the Twelfth Session of the Hague Conference which will convene at The
Hague, Netherlands in October, 1972. See generally REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE MEETING OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (Mar. 29-Apr. 6, 1971> (unpublished materials of the United States
Department of State on file in the offices of the CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW
JOURNAL).
30. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COiIISSION ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, PREL. Doc.
No. 3 at 3 (Sept. 1970) (unpublished material of the United States Department of
State on file in the offices of the CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL).
See also Bourke, supra note 29, at 283:
In the area of products liability the need for a single rule as to choice of
Cornell International Law Journal/Vol. 5, No. 1
might be a suitable alternative for solving many of the problems which
confront, and often bewilder, plaintiffs in international products li-
ability cases.
Under this possible choice of law procedure whereby a plaintiff is
allowed to "choose" the nation's law that will govern his litigation, his
choice would, of course, have to be reasonably limited to the circum-
stances surrounding his injury. This could easily be provided for by
restricting his selection of governing law to the law of the nation in
which: (1) the plaintiff "habitually resides;" 31 (2) the defendant has
his principal place of business;32 (3) the defective product was manu-
law seemed even more urgent [to the Special Commission] because of the
variety of possible alternatives, and because of the complexities arising from
the fact that the place of manufacture and the place of injury rarely co-
incide.
31. The term habitual residence is difficult to define with any precision. As
pointed out in American Law Institute, RESrATE MENT (SEcOND) OF CONFLICTS OF
LAws, § 11, Comment h, at 45 (1971):
Residence is an ambiguous word whose meaning in a legal phrase [contained
within a statute or, analogously, a treaty] must be determined in each case.
Frequently it is used in a sense equivalent to domicile. On occasion it means
something more than domicile, namely, a domicile at which a person actually
dwells. On the other hand, it may mean somethng else than domicile,
namely, a place where the individual has an abode or where he has settled
down to live for a period of time, but not necessarily with such an inten-
tion of making a home there as to create a domicile.
In order to afford courts operating under an "International Products Liability Con-
vention" a maximum of flexibility, hopefully to the end that that flexibility would
be used to prevent injustice, the term "habitual resident" might best be defined in
the third manner set out in Comment k to section 11 of the RESTATEMENT (SECoND.
OF CONFLICTS OF LAws. Specifically, habitual residence would mean "something else
than domicile, namely, a place where the individual . . . has settled down to live
for a period of time ...." See note 46 infra.
Naturally, circumstances might still arise in which a plaintiff had several "habitual
residences." Presumptions might be created for judicial guidance in those cases (see,
e.g., text accompanying note 63 infra), but basically, as in any "hard case," a trier
of fact would have to exercise his own best judgment in light of the equities involved
in each individual case.
32. The concept of the "principal place of business" of a "legal person" (corpora-
tion) is basically a civil law principle which is often at odds with the common law
preference for the concept of "state of incorporation or organization." Under the
common law principle, a corporation is governed by the law of the country from
which it derives its existence. On the other hand, the civil law "principal place of
business" doctrine (expressed as "siege social" in French and as "Geschaftssitz" in
German) considers the law governing the acts of a private law corporation to be
that of the state in which that corporation has its "center." The "center" of a
corporation is generally identified with its "chief executive office." Thus, "center"
is often equated with "headquarters" or "the office where the central management
and control are exercised." See generally 2 E. RAnrm, supra note 18, at 31-68.
Cf. H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 83-87 (1968).
Though "principal place of business" may, at times, be as ambiguous a term as
"habitual residence," it is, in an international context, preferable to the common
law concept of "state of incorporation." The nation in which a corporation is
organized may often be selected for its "convenience," its tax advantages, or its other
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factured; (4) the plaintiff acquired the defective product; or (5) the
plaintiff was injured by the defective product. Often these categories
would coincide, so that in reality the plaintiff might not have a choice of
more than two or three nations' laws under which he might bring his
claim.
This proposal may, however, be criticised for its "partiality" to con-
sumers in that it allows plaintiffs an option that is denied to defend,
ants. Still, in light of the potential economic and legal resources
ordinarily available to manufacturers that distribute their products
internationally, a rule which favored plaintiffs in this respect would do
no more than put them in parity with their opponent. In other words,
the plaintiff's advantage of selecting the determinative law would in
most cases be more than compensated for by the manufacturer's
superior financial and legal assets.
On the other hand, despite its simplicity, there may be several funda-
mental, irreconcilable problems in such an "optional" selection of law
procedure. A proposal which allows a plaintiff to select in advance the
law which will determine the outcome of his claim is not yet an estab-
lished precedent in international law, and therefore, it is likely to be
resisted by some nations having more conservative legal philosophies. 33
Furthermore, despite the evident trend towards consumer protection in
the United States34 and among other economically developed nations,3 5
a rule which tended to make manufacturers increasingly liable in money
favorable legislation with respect to corporations. Thus, in products liability litigation,
the nation under whose laws the defendant manufacturer was organized might only be
remotely connected with circumstances of the case at hand. Second, the concept of
principal place of business is not wholly unfamiliar in the common law world. In fact,
in the United States, the exact words "principal place of business" are used in 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (c) (1970) which deals with determining the "citizenship" of a
corporation for the purpose of federal diversity jurisdiction. Finally, the term "prin-
cipal place of business" is advantageous because of its extensive use (and hence its
large "familiarity" and "reputation" within the international community in previous
international treaties. An extensive list of such treaties, to which common and civil
law countries alike are parties, appears in 2 E. RABEL, supra note 18, at 36 nn. 13, 15,
and 16.
33. Professor W. L. M. Reese, the American expert at the two working sessions of the
Special Commission, supra note 29, has disclosed that when the American delegation
first presented to the members of the Special Commission an optional choice of law
plan similar to the one outlined in the text above, the French representative re-
marked that such a proposal was nothing less than "immoral!" In light of similar
reactions by other members of the Special Commission, the United States did not
urge the adoption of this optional procedure as vigorously as it had originally
planned. Unpublished Remarks of Professor W. L. M. Reese, Symposium on the
Unification of Private International Law, Regional Meeting of the American So-
ciety of International Law, Cornell Law School, Ithaca, N.Y. (Mar. 13, 1971).
34. See, e.g., J. BIsHOP & H. HUBBARD, LET THE SELLER BEwARE (1969).
35. An evolving trend towards consumer protection, for instance, is reflected in the
West German cases cited and reviewed in Kessler, supra note 9, at 911-24.
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damages might be resisted by nations whose industries were not yet so
highly developed nor so clearly capable of withstanding harsh standards
of strict products liability.36
B. SELECTION OF THE GOVERNING LAW IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PLAINTIFF's DoMIcILE
An alternative to the "optional" selection procedure as a uniform
choice of law rule in international products liability litigation would be
to base the selection of the determinative law of a case upon a single, non-
optional criterion. The best criterion might, for instance, be a require-
ment that the controversy be governed by the law of the nation where
the injured plaintiff was domiciled. This test would allow a consumer
to assert his claim against a foreign manufacturer in accordance with
laws and precedents with which the consumer was presumably very
familiar. This choice of law rule would also eliminate a plaintiff's need
to prove such frequently tenuous facts as where the manufacturer had his
principal place of business or where the defective product was actually
manufactured, as, for instance, in the case of a manufacturer who owned
several subsidiary plants in different countries.
As with the "optional" approach to choice of law selection, however,
the primary difficulty of such a rule is that it might prove harsh on
manufacturers in developing countries who exported their products to
more economically developed countries. The liability of such a manu-
facturer to a consumer who was domiciled in the United States, for
instance, might prove ruinous in a suit where high money damages were
awarded.37 A single criterion rule based on domicile might also encourage
36. In this respect, it is interesting to note that the Special Commission on Prod-
ucts Liability is marked by a conspicuous absence of members from Central and
South America, Africa, and Asia (exclusive of Japan). The Special Commission as
well as the Hague Conference is dominated by nations with highly developed internal
economies. For a list of the Special Commission's members, see note 29 supra.
37. Experience with the Warsaw Convention, 49 Stat. 3000 (1936), T.S. No. 876,
137 L.N.T.S. 11, is illustrative of the disparity which might exist between what the
United States considers an appropriate "maximum" for plaintiffs' recoveries in
accident-injury cases and what other countries believe that appropriate maximum
should be.
The Warsaw Convention, formulated in 1929, established a limit on damages for
personal injury claims in commercial airline accidents. That limit is now equivalent
to $8,300. Prior to 1966, American citizens, accustomed to large verdicts in accident-
injury cases, were dissatisfied with this maximum limit. Therefore, under the threat
that it would denounce the Convention, effective May 15, 1966, the United States
finally obtained a commitment from most American and foreign air carriers of pas-
sengers to and from the United States that they would, as of May 16, 1966, accept
a $75,000 maximum limit in accident-injury claims by American citizens. Many other
countries, however, still adhere to the Convention's $8,300 limitation. H. STEINR &
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manufacturers to be less careful in manufacturing products that they
shipped to countries whose traditional choice of law rules did not fa-
cilitate the selection of a governing law that would more easily grant a
recovery to the consumer involved in a products liability case. 38
Realizing that they would not be held to so high a standard of care in
certain foreign jurisdictions, manufacturers might export a lower quality
of merchandise than they distribute at home.39
Finally, this type of choice of law rule might also be undesirable be-
cause of the many complications that are attendant to the concept of
domicile.40 Since domicile is often a more rigid concept than "habitual
residence," a choice of law rule based on the former criterion might lack
flexibility. Many cases could arise, for instance, in which the nation
where a plaintiff was held to be domiciled would be only remotely con-
nected to -the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff's injuries and his
subsequent claim for redress of damages. 41
C. SELECTION OF THE GOVERNING LAW IN ACCORDANCE WITH
A "HIERARCHY" OF CRITERIA
A more realistic solution to the problem of selecting a uniform choice
D. VAGTs, supra note 32, at 451-52; Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United States and
the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REv. 497 (1967).
38. This practice could easily result in harmfuil consumer discrimination on the part
of manufacturers. By shipping more carefully manufactured merchandise to those na-
tions whose choice of law rules facilitated plaintiff-consumers' recoveries in products
liability cases, manufacturers might be forced to "dump" their less carefully manu-
factured, and hence potentially more dangerous, merchandise in other countries whose
choice of law rules were not so conducive to plaintiff-consumers' recoveries. Con-
sumers in the latter type of country would then be exposed to a greater likelihood of
injuries from defective products with an attendant smaller chance of success in
products. liability litigation.
39. Such practices are already a reality. For instance, when the United States Food
and Drug Administration banned the sale of products containing cyclamates in the
United States, manufacturers of the artificial sweetener continued to ship thousands
of cases of cyclamate-treated canned fruits to West Germany which did not regulate
the sale of such products. Other large industries also frequently engage in similar prac-
tices. Sesser, Peddling Dangerous Drugs Abroad; Special Dispensation, THE NEw RE-
PUBLIC, Mar. 6, 1971, at 16-17.
40. Such complications often involved the interplay of three classes of domicile:
(1) domicile of origin; (2) domicile of choice; and (3) domicile by operation of law.
These three classes and the legal complications to which they give rise in practice are
cogently discussed in Estate of Jones, 192 Iowa 78, 182 N.W. 227 (1921).
41. This is demonstrated analogously in White v. Tennant, 31 W.Va. 790, 8 S.E. 596
(1888). In that case, involving the descent and distribution of the personal estate of
an intestate decedent who had died in West Virginia, the decedent was held to be a
domiciliary of Pennsylvania even though he had lived all his life in West Virginia and
had never even spent a night in a new "home" he acquired in Pennsylvania approxi-
mately one month before his death.
Cornell International Law Journal/Vol. 5, No. I
of law rule, then, might be to arrange a "hierarchy" of criteria which
would govern the selection of the applicable law in international prod-
ucts liability cases. Under this approach, a plaintiff's choice of the ap-
plicable law to govern his claim would not be optional, but neither
would it be limited to a single unvarying criterion. Instead, there would
be a set of several criteria which would specify in more or less "de-
scending" order the circumstances under which a particular choice of
law rule would be applicable.
This approach is clearly illustrated in the work of the Hague Com-
mission on Products Liability. In the draft of its proposed convention,' 2
the Special Commission proposes that, when applicable, 43 the liability
of a manufacturer 44 in a products liability case will be governed&
42. The English "Text Adopted by the Special Commission" [hereinafter referred
to as "Proposed Convention"] is annexed to the REPORT OF TIlE UNITED STATES REI'RE-
sENTATVE, supra note 29. It is also reprinted in its entirety in the Annex, infra.
43. Article 1 of the Proposed Convention provides:
This Convention shall determine the law applicable to the liability of a
manufacturer or other supplier for damage resulting from a product, with the
exception of cases where the victim acquired the product from that manufac-
turer or other supplier.
This law shall apply irrespective of the kind of proceeding that may be
involved.
Thus, the Convention would not cover cases where the plaintiff bought a defective
product directly from a manufacturer. Under such circumstances, it would be un-
likely that the two parties would be citizens of different nations anyway, and there-
fore a uniform choice of law rule, at least from an international perspective, would
be irrelevant.
This exclusion was also made to avoid possible complications with "privity of
contract" notions as well as various tort-contract dichotomies which exist in manyjurisdictions. Unpublished remarks of Professor W. L. M. Reese, supra note 33. See also
note 6 supra.
44. The term "manufacturer," as used by the Special Commission, has a very broad
meaning. Article 2 of the Proposed Convention provides:
In this Convention "manufacturer or other supplier" shall include:(a) a manufacturer or other supplier of the finished product or of a com-
ponent part;
(b) a person in the commercial chain of distribution of the product; and
(c) any person who gives possession of the product for value.
See note 28 supra.
45. The Proposed Convention, Article 6, defines the matters governed by the law
selected under its provisions as follows:
Matters governed by the law made applicable by this Convention shall include:
I the basis and extent of liability;
2 the grounds for exemption from liability, any limitation of liablity and
any division of liability;
3 the existence and kinds of injury or damage which may have to be com-
pensated;
4 the kinds and extent of damages;
5 the question whether a right to damages may be assigned or inherited;
6 the persons who have suffered damage and who may claim damages in
their own right;
7 vicarious liability, including the liability of a principal for the acts of
his agent or of a master for the acts of his servant;
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initially by "the internal law of the state of the habitual residence at
the time of the accident of the person directly injured by the product. ' 4
This choice of law rule, though initially controlling in international
products liability litigation, is made contingent upon the condition
that the manufacturer of the defective product approve of the dis-
tribution of his merchandise in the country of the plaintiff's habitual
residence. 47 If, therefore, the facts show that the manufacturer did
not expressly or impliedly approve of the distribution of his product
in the nation where the plaintiff habitually resides, 48 then the second
8 the burden of proof;
9 rule of prescription and limitation, including rules relating to the com-
mencement of a period of prescription or limitation, and the interruption
and suspension of this period.
46. The term "habitual residence" was introduced at the first working session of
the Special Commisson by the Dutch expert, J. C. Schultsz. It represents an attempt
to eliminate the prospect that the notion of "domicile" might "rear its ugly head."
REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMfMISSION ON PRODUCrS LIABILITY, supra note 30, at 9.
While the use of this term in an international convention may eliminate many of
the problems attendant to the concept of domicile, it may well, owing to its lack of
precision, introduce additional problems of its own. Professor David Cavers has
noted in this repect:
The concept of "habitual residence" as a substitute for "domicile," with its
encrustation of parochial specifications, is making substantial progress abroad,
especially in the Hague Conventions, but the bounds of the new concept have
yet to be worked out in application.
Cavers, Legislative Choice of Law: Some European Examples, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 340,
350 n. 41 (1971) (emphasis supplied).
In practice, perhaps "habitual residence" will come to encompass the definition
suggested in note 31 supra. Cf. Nadelmann, Habitual Residence and Nationality as
Tests at The Hague: The 1968 Convention on Recognition of Divorces, 47 TEXAS L.
REv. 766 (1969).
47. Interestingly, the Convention does not specifically limit its provisions to "pur-
chasers" only. Thus, an individual injured by a defectively manufactured product
may still come within the coverage of the Convention, even though he did not directly
purchase the product himself. Article 3 of the Proposed Convention (emphasis sup-
plied provides:
The applicable law shall be the internal law of the State of the habitual
residence at the time of the accident of the person directly injured by the
product. This law, however, shall not apply if neither this product nor products
of the same origin and the same type were available in that State through
commercial channels with the consent, express or implied, of the person
claimed to be liable.
The language of this article does not appear to require the plaintiff to buy the
defective product in the country in which he habitually resides in order for the ex-
ception to apply. Thus, if a West German bought an American product in France,
this choice of law rule would not become applicable unless the American manufac-
turer consented to the distribution of his product in West Germany, the "habitual
residence . . .of the person directly injured by the product." See note 59 infra.
48. Circumstances could arise where a determination of a manufacturer's "implied"
approval would be difficult to prove as a matter of fact. In such case, the fact finder
would have to determine whether, in his best judgment, the manufacturer could have
"reasonably foreseen" that his product would have been used in the country in ques-
tion. See note 61 infra.
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rule in the "hierarchy" becomes operative.
In the convention being worked on by the Special Commission, this
second rule would be that the controversy was governed by the law of
the country wherein the plaintiff was injured, i.e., where the "accident
occurred." 49 Again, this rule would be subject to a "proviso" similar to
the one in the first rule, that is, for the rule to become effective, the
manufacturer must have approved the distribution of his product in
the country where the product was acquired.5 0
Finally, if the circumstances of the case do not allow the first or the
second rule to be brought to bear, then the law of the nation in
which the defendant manufacturer had his "principal place of busi-
ness" would ultimately control the litigation.51 Of course, other op-
tions might be added to this hierarchy of applicable laws as, for in-
stance, the law of the nation where the defective product was manufac-
tured52 or the law of the nation where the product was acquired. 3
49. Article 4 of the Proposed Convention provides, in part:
If the law designated in article 3 does not apply, the applicable law shall
be the internal law of the State in which the accident occurred.
50. Artice 4 of the Proposed Convention continues:
This law, however, shall not apply if neither the product nor products of
the same origin and the same type were available in that State through com-
mercial channels with the consent, express or implied, of the person claimed
to be liable.
51. Article 5 of the Proposed Convention states:
If neither of the laws designated in articles 3 and 4 applies, the applicable
law shall be the internal law of the State of the principal place of business
of the person claimed to be liable.
If, however, several manufacturers or other suppliers are claimed to be
liable, the internal law of the State of the principal place of business of the
manufacturer of the finished product shall determine the liability of all of
them.
No attempt was made by the Special Commission to define the term "principal
place of business." REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 29, at 5.
But see note 32 supra.
52. The first draft Convention prepared by the Special Commission at its initial
working session (September 7-12, 1970) did, in fact, contain such an option. Article
4 of that Convention provided that if the manufacturer had not approved of the
sale of his products in the nation in which the consumer purchased the defective
product or in the nation in which the consumer was injured, then "the law
of the place of manufacture of the product" would be the governing law in a
products liability case. ILLUSTRATIONS OF PROPOSALS DISCuSSED BY THE SPECIAL COM-
MISSION ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY, PREL. Doc. No. 4 at 2 (Dec. 1, 1970) (unpublished
material of the United States Department of State on file in the offices of the CORNELL
INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL).
This option was, however, dropped by the second working session of the Special
Commission (March 29 - April 6, 1971). The term "principal place of business" was
substituted for "place of manufacture." REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE,
supra note 29, at 5.
53. This option was also adopted by the first working session of the Special Commis-
sion. Article 3a of the draft Convention prepared by that working session provided:
If the condition pertaining to the approved sale of similar products as stated
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The addition of further "steps" in the hierarchy, however, might
create more confusion than the plan was designed to prevent. A de-
termination of the nation in which the defective product was manu-
factured might be very difficult in the case of a large international
firm which manufactured identical products in two or more countries.
An additional criterion such as where the product was acquired might de-
pend on purely fortuitous circumstances and might also be difficult to
rely on in cases where the injury had begun in one country but had cul-
minated in another.54
Moreover, a hierarchy of choice of law rules may have its own
disadvantages. Despite its value as a means of adding certainty and pre-
dictability to choice of law problems in international products li-
ability cases, such an approach may, in practice, fail to operate
equitably. Inequities in the operation of such a plan might result
from inadequately or poorly defined terms55 or from the effect of the
several "exception" clauses which are an important element of the
plan.56 Though such inequities do not necessarily present insurmount-
in article 2 [making the law of the nation of plaintiff's habitual residence de-
terminative of the case] is not fulfilled:
a. the liability of a manufacturer towards a person directly suffering damage
who acquired the product himself shall be governed by the law of the country
in which the product was acquired; ....
ILLUSTRATIONS OF PROPOSALS DIscussED BY THE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON PRODUCTs LI-
ABILITY, supra note 52, at 1.
The second working session of the Special Commission, however, simply abandoned
this criterion, preferring instead a choice of law rule dependent, in the alternative,
on the nation wherein the consumer was injured. REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES REP-
RESENTATIvE, supra note 29, at 6.
54. This could easily be the case where a defectively manufactured pill was taken
in one country but produced no ill effects until the consumer was elsewhere. A criterion
based on where the pill was purchased would seem totally without significance in
determining which nation's law was to govern the consumer's cause of action under
such circumstances.
55. The deliberations of the Special Commission on Products Liability clearly reflect
this fact. A considerable amount of the Special Commission's time was devoted to a
consideration of such crucial terms as "manufacturer," "habitual residence," and
"product." REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMlISSION ON PRODUcTS LIABILITY, supra note 30,
at 3-4, 9-10. See also REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 29,
at 4-5.
56. Professor Reese has illustrated this point by means of the following example:
Consider . . . the case where in New York a Frenchman is injured both by
the product of a large New York manufacturer, whose products are sold in
France, and by the product of a small New York manufacturer, whose products
are only sold in the United States. Under the convention, the more lenient
French law would be applied to determine the liability of the large manu-
facturer [because he had consented to the distribution of his product in France,
the nation in which the buyer habitually resided] while the more onerous
New York law would be applied to the small manufacturer [because he had
not consented to the distribution of his product in France and, thus, the gov-
erning law of the litigation in which he was involved would be the law of
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able obstacles to the creation of an effective uniform choice of law
rule consistent with an "hierarchial" approach, it is obvious that fur-
ther refinement of this plan is necessary before it could be adopted
on a world-wide basis.
D. SELECTION OF THE GOVERNING LAW IN ACCORDANCE WITH
A "LIMITED HIERARCHY" OF CRITERIA
A substantial improvement of the above discussed "three-step"
hierarchial approach to a uniform choice of law rule57 would be to
refine that approach into a more "limited hierarchy" for the selec-
tion of the governing law of an international products liability case.
One such refinement would be to eliminate the fortuitous criterion of
"place of accident" as determinative of the applicable law. The nation
in which a consumer habitually resides and the nation in which he
may be injured by a defectively manufactured product may, of course,
often be one and the same. In light of the increasing mobility of the
world's population,58 however, there may be a substantial number of
instances in which the nation wherein a plaintiff habitually resides
and the nation wherein he is injured are not the same. Therefore, a
more equitable priority than (1) habitual residence, (2) place of ac-
cident, and (3) principal place of business would appear to be simply
(1) habitual residence and (2) principal place of business. A "two-
stage" hierarchial approach such as this would reduce confusion and
problems of factual proof to a minimum. As compared to a "three-
stage" approach, for instance, this alternative would eliminate by one-
half opportunities for litigation on the potentially hard to prove fact
of whether the manufacturer had given his "consent" to the sale of
his product in the country in question. This point would still be
relevant at the first stage of determining the applicable law (plaintiff's
habitual residence) but would not be in issue again at the second
stage (principal place of business). Thus, a manufacturer's "consent"
to the distribution of his merchandise would need to be proved only
the state where he had his principal place of business]. Discrimination such
as this might conceivably violate the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution. In any event, such discrimination would, on
occasion, almost surely shock our sense of justice.
REPORT OF THE UNITED STATEs REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 29, at 8.
Though Professor Reese pointed out the inequities which might arise under tile
Convention in the circumstances of the example set out above, his arguments were
rejected, "because of what was thought to be the overwhelming importance of sim-
plicity and predictability." REPORT OF THE UNITED STATEs REPRESENTATIVE, supra note
29, at 8.
57. See text accompanying notes 42-56 supra.




This type of choice of law rule would also eliminate the possi-
bility that a consumer and a manufacturer would be involved in
litigation which was governed by substantive laws totally unfamiliar
to either of them. It would be fair to assume that a consumer is
familiar with the law of the nation in which he habitually resides and
that a manufacturer is familiar with the law of the nation wherein he
has his principal place of business. But neither a consumer who vaca-
tions in a foreign nation nor a manufacturer who turns his product
over to an independent foreign wholesaler is likely to bother to ac-
quaint himself with the peculiarities of a foreign nation in which
an accident may fortuitously occur. Therefore, any subsequent prod-
ucts liability case which depended on a detailed analysis of the law of
a nation with which neither the consumer nor the manufacturer was
familiar could easily involve a considerable amount of confusion, ex-
pense, and delay, otherwise at least partially avoidable by the elimin,
ation of the "place of accident" criterion from the applicable choice of
law rule.60
A further refinement of the hierarchial approach to a uniform choice
of law rule could be made through a careful use of specific burden of
proof allocations. 61 The smooth operation of an international choice
59. Consider, for instance, the case of a West German consumer who bought an
American product in France and who, instead of being injured in West Germany, was
injured in France. In such circumstances, the American manufacturer could, under
a "three-stage" hierarchial approach, first dispute that he had approved of the dis-
tribution of his product in West Germany (plaintiff's habitual residence). Then,
if he successfully proved that point, he could further contend that he did not approve
of the distribution of his product in France (situs of the accident. In a "two-stage"
approach, the only issue would be the manufacturer's approval of the distribution
of his product in West Germany.
60. Of course, many cases would arise where one of the parties was unfamiliar with
the law selected to govern the case at hand. Thus, if the law of the plaintiff's
habitual residence was determinative, then the manufacturer might be handicapped
by his unfamiliarity with that law. The opposite would be true if the law of the
manufacturer's principal place of business were determinative. Nonetheless, the elim-
ination of the "place of accident" criterion would greatly reduce the likehood that
both parties in the case would be strangers to the governing law.
61. At present, the Proposed Convention, Article 6(8), has only the following refer-
ence to "burden of proof":
Matters governed by the law made applicable by this convention shall in-
clude: ...
8 the burden of proof; ....
In the REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE, supra note 29, at 8, Professor
Reese stated that:
There was [at the Special Commission's second working session] considerable
argument as to which party should have the burden of proving, or disproving,
that goods of the same origin and type were available in that country with
the consent, express or implied, of the defendant. . . I argued that the
burden should be on the defendant. A number of persons supported me,
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of law rule could also be facilitated by providing that, in international
products liability cases, there would always exist a rebuttable presump-
tion on behalf of the consumer that the manufacturer had consented to
the distribution of his product in the country of the consumer's habitual
residence. The burden of proving otherwise, therefore, would ordinarily
fall upon the manufacturer. 62 Similarly a rebuttable or perhaps even
a conclusive presumption could exist that a manufacturer's principal
place of business is in the nation under whose laws it is organized. If
that is clearly not the case, as for instance where a manufacturer has
organized in a nation solely for the sake of "convenience," then a
second rebuttable (or conclusive) presumption could exist that the
manufacturer's principal place of business is located in the nation
wherein the manufacturer sells (in terms of gross receipts) the greatest
portion of its merchandise.
Another valuable presumption would be that, in the absence of
clear evidence to the contrary, the nation in which a consumer pur-
chases a defectively manufactured product is also the nation in which
he "habitually resides." 63 This presumption would be of little value
in circumstances where the consumer was clearly a transient in the
country in which he purchased the defective product. On the other
hand, the presumption would be very useful in "close" cases in which
the plaintiff spent his time equally among several different countries.
If one of those countries were also the place where he bought the defec-
tive product, then, for the purposes of an international products liability
case, that would also be the country of his "habitual residence."
Thus, when the hierarchial approach to international choice of
law problems is condensed into a less complicated "two-stage" for-
mat and is made more definitive by specific burden of proof pro-
visions, it becomes potentially the most satisfactory means yet avail-
able to eliminate the confusion and uncertainty in present inter-
national products liability litigation. By arranging the applicable law
to an international products liability case in a standard, easily under-
stood order, this approach eliminates many of the former barriers to
consumer recovery for injuries from defective merchandise, while, at
while others disagreed on the ground that the defendant should not be
required to prove a negative. Eventually, it was decided to say nothing
on the subject.
62. The case might arise in which it would be to the consumer's advantage that
the law of his country of habitual residence did not apply. This would be true if the
law of the nation wherein the manufacturer had his principal place of business was
more lenient than the law of the consumer's habitual residence. In such cases, the
burden of proof would then be shifted to the consumer to prove that the presump-
tion was not true.
63. See notes 31 and 46 supra.
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the same time, protecting manufacturers from the possible arbitrari-
ness of a single, invariable criterion on which a choice of the govern-
ing law might be based. Like the other proposed rules, it offers ad-
vantages of uniformity and predictability, but, unlike the other pro-
posed rules, it best achieves an optimum balance between the interests
of consumers on the one hand and the interests of manufacturers on
the other. Therefore, while much remains to be done before an inter-
national convention becomes a reality, there is still hope that with
the increasing scope of international trade and travel, consumers may
eventually have a uniform and, more importantly, predictable choice
of law rule to use in their attempts to seek reimbursement for in-
juries suffered as a result of defectively manufactured merchandise.
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ANNEX
"TEXT ADOPTED BY THE SPECIAL COMMISSION"
Article 1
This Convention shall determine the law applicable to the liability
of a manufacturer or other supplier for damage resulting from a
product, with the exception of cases where the victim acquired the
product from that manufacturer or other supplier.
This law shall apply irrespective of the kind of proceeding that may
be involved.
Article 2
In this Convention "manufacturer or other supplier" shall include:
(a) a manufacturer or other supplier of the finished product or of
a component part;
(b) a person in the commercial chain of distribution of the product; and
(c) any person who gives possession of the product for value.
Article 3
The applicable law shall be the internal law of the State of the
habitual residence at the time of the accident of the person directly
injured by the product. This law, however, shall not apply if neither
this product nor products of the same origin and the same type were
available in that State through commercial channels with the consent,
express or implied, of the person claimed to be liable.
Article 4
If the law designated in article 3 does not apply, the applicable
law shall be the internal law of the State in which the accident oc-
curred. This law, however, shall not apply if neither the product nor
products of the same origin and the same type were available in that
State through commercial channels with the consent, express or im-
plied, of the person claimed to be liable.
Article 5
If neither of the laws designated in articles 3 and 4 applies, the ap-
plicable law shall be the internal law of the State of the principal place
of business of the person claimed to be liable.
If, however, several manufacturers or other suppliers are claimed to
be liable, the internal law of the State of the principal place of busi-
ness of the manufacturer of the finished product shall determine the
liability of all of them.
Article 6
Matters governed by the law made applicable by this Convention
shall include:
1 the basis and extent of liability;
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2 the grounds for exemption from liability, any limitation of liability
and any division of liability;
3 the existence and kinds of injury or damage which may have to be
compensated;
4 the kinds and extent of damages;
5 the question whether a right to damages may be assigned or in-
herited;
6 the persons who have suffered damage and who may claim damages
in their own right;
7 vicarious liability, including the liability of a principal for the acts
of his agent or of a master for the acts of his servant;
8 the burden of proof;
9 rules of prescription and limitation, including rules relating to the
commencement of a period of prescription or limitation, and the
interruption and suspension of this period.

